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RETAIL LOANS & BASEL II: 
USING PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION 
TO REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
ECRI RESEARCH REPORT NO. 8 
Daniel Kaltofen, Stephan Paul & Stefan Stein 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
n 2004, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision adopted recommendations 
for a revised framework for risk measurement and corresponding equity capital 
standards to further strengthen the soundness and stability of the international 
banking system (‘Basel II’). The implementation of the new framework in EU 
member jurisdictions is scheduled for year-end 2006 although some advanced 
approaches to risk measurement will only become available at year-end 2007. 
The key concept of the revised framework is that the existing regulations pertaining to 
credit risk will be differentiated to a greater extent through the integration of external 
ratings or individualised through reference to the internal ratings of financial 
institutions. Certain methods that aim to determine the necessary capital requirements, 
particularly those developed in-house by banks must only be applied by a bank once 
they have been comprehensively audited by the supervisory authority (the so-called 
Supervisory Review Process). This can only happen once the bank has informed the 
financial markets of the structure of its systems within the framework of its disclosure 
obligations. 
Under the revised framework, banks will for the first time be permitted to group their 
loans to private individuals (e.g. credit cards, overdrafts, residential mortgages, home 
equity loans and other personal loans such as education or car loans) and small 
corporate clients into a ‘retail portfolio’. In this respect, Basel II will permit banks to 
choose between the internal ratings based (IRB) approach (dealt with in this paper) and 
the standardised approach for calculating their capital requirements for the credit risk of 
their retail portfolio.  
While significant progress has been made in understanding the risk of commercial 
credits, we find that far less research has been undertaken on measuring (and managing) 
credit risk in retail portfolios, on either a theoretical or practical basis. This is surprising 
given the narrow range of options that the revised framework will grant to banks in 
calculating the capital requirements on their retail portfolios: there will be no 
differentiation between a foundation and an advanced IRB approach that is found in 
other asset classes (e.g. corporate portfolios). The retail IRB approach is an advanced 
approach and is therefore far more demanding: banks must themselves estimate all of 
the loss variables, which are entered into the Basel formula, in order to determine the 
capital requirement of the credit risk. When estimating these variables, banks should not 
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value their retail claims individually but group them together into ‘homogenous pools’. 
Basel II will leave banks with considerable margin for manoeuvre as to how to group 
similar loans into pools with homogenous loss characteristics. 
This paper takes the retail IRB requirements as its central feature. In accordance with 
the regulatory guidelines, we develop an ‘optimised segmentation approach’ with 
regard to the credit default event and measure the implications for regulatory capital 
requirements. The approach presented will enable banks to improve their measurement 
of credit risk and the corresponding management of equity capital resources.  
We identify risk drivers and operating figures, describing them in order to efficiently 
separate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ loans. As regards methodology, we present an innovative 
technique and test it on a data set of approximately 413,000 motor vehicle loans. We 
use a ‘recursive partitioning procedure’, which overcomes the disadvantages of the 
more familiar parametric methods and delivers more robust results.  
By classifying loans according to selective predictors of default, we find that banks can 
achieve significant savings in terms of ensuring a lower regulatory capital requirement. 
As segmentation quality increases, the capital requirement for performing loans falls 
significantly. In principle, there is a direct correlation between segmentation quality and 
the level of the regulatory capital requirement. This provides banks with the opportunity 
to increase lending capacity. 
Moreover, we calculate a comparatively low capital requirement (3.02% for the 
unexpected loss portion of the credit risk) for our reference portfolio. This is due to the 
fact that our portfolio is made up of motor vehicle loans only. In the event of a loan 
default, there is the potential for a bank to recover up to approximately 75% of the 
exposure by selling the vehicles accepted as collateral in comparatively efficient 
secondary markets. At the same time, borrowers show particular sensitivity when motor 
vehicles are used as collateral. The anxiety of borrowers to avoid repossession of their 
car by the bank means that they are more willing to keep up payments on the loan 
versus payments on other instalment loans for goods/services that are regarded by the 
borrower as less important. 
With the help of the method introduced here, a meaningful differentiation of the credit 
risk becomes possible and the default probability and the amount of possible credit 
losses can be consistently and accurately assessed. For bank profitability, it is of the 
utmost importance that banks include their risk assessment for different groups of 
borrowers in their credit pricing and indeed earn the calculated risk premiums in the 
market. In this respect, risk-based pricing signals also promote the goal of consumer 
protection by supporting responsible borrowing decisions, which, in view of the 
growing debt burden of private households, has become increasingly important. 
Finally, we call for a proportionate, pragmatic treatment of different modi operandi 
used by the banks assessed under the new Supervisory Review Process, which includes 
in-house approaches to modelling credit risk. Although the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has committed itself in this respect to a flexible approach 
that grants banks considerable scope for action to promote innovation within this sector, 
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supervision. If the provisions of the revised framework remain in a general rather than a 
specific form, they will be left open to interpretation by the supervised institutions and 
supervising institutions will have considerable margin for manoeuvre in how they 
evaluate those institutions. On the one hand, this entails a risk that actions will be 
hidden from view by banks, while on the other, there is a danger that the banks will 
receive unequal treatment. As such, the objective of competitive equality could be 
jeopardised. The alternative, i.e. fixing rigid compliance to highly detailed regulations, 
would mean that supervisory guidelines essentially pre-define risk management criteria. 
If this were to occur, there is a danger that one of the original aims of Basel II, i.e. the 
promotion of further development and improvement of risk management through 
competition among financial institutions, would be lost. 
 
JEL classification: C14; C25; C53; G21; G28 
 
Keywords: Basel  II, retail portfolio, capital requirement for credit risks, portfolio 
segmentation, classification algorithms | 1 
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USING PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION 
TO REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
ECRI RESEARCH REPORT NO. 8 
Daniel Kaltofen, Stephan Paul & Stefan Stein 
1.  Basel II: A new framework for risk measurement and corresponding equity 
capital standards 
1.1  Overview of Basel II 
Since the early 1980s, there have been calls – at least among the major economic 
nations – for the urgent harmonisation of the numerous and disparate international 
supervisory standards that exist. A driving force behind these calls has been the need to 
eradicate regulatory arbitrage, where transactions are undertaken in those countries 
subject to the weakest regulatory supervision. Following a joint campaign by the 
national banking supervisory bodies of the United States and of Great Britain, in 1988 
the recommendations of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision were passed by 
the central bank governors of the ‘Group of Ten’ (the so-called ‘Basel Capital Accord’, 
now termed ‘Basel I’).  
The publication, entitled “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards – A Revised Framework”, issued in June 2004
1 (Basel Committee, 
2004), followed several consultation papers and was an attempt by the Basel Committee 
to almost completely revise the 1988 Accord (‘New Basel Capital Accord’ or ‘Basel 
II’). Through this revision, the committee’s aim is to “further strengthen the soundness 
and stability of the international banking system”. While maintaining the current overall 
regulatory capital requirement, the new regulation aims to manage bank risks on a more 
comprehensive, risk-sensitive and individual basis. At the same time, the committee 
intends to improve competitive equality among banks and to encourage banks to further 
develop risk measurement and management systems. 
Under this new framework, a three-pillar approach will be used to achieve these 
objectives (for an overview see Dierick et al., 2005, Allen et al., 2004; Allen & 
Saunders, 2004). For decades, banks have been exposed to quantitative capital 
requirements (Pillar 1) with regard to credit risks, and since 1988, even to market risks. 
Under the new framework, however, the existing regulations pertaining to credit risk 
will be differentiated to a greater extent through the integration of external ratings, or 
                                                 
1 In July 2006 the Basel Committee issued a comprehensive version, which is a “compilation of the June 
2004 Basel II Framework, the elements of the 1988 Accord that were not revised during the Basel II 
process, the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, and the 2005 paper 
on the Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects. No 
new elements have been introduced in this compilation”. 2 | KALTOFEN, PAUL & STEIN 
 
individualised through reference to the internal ratings of financial institutions. At the 
same time, so-called operational risks will be limited by quantitative regulations for the 
first time ever. With regard to these two areas of risk, the committee is pursuing a 
‘forward-looking approach’ (as before for market risks) to ensure that the framework 
keeps pace with market developments and advances in risk management practices. 
Banks will be allowed to choose between either the standardised approaches or more 
sophisticated in-house approaches. Although the latter call for more development input, 
the regulators prefer these methods given their greater precision and risk-sensitivity, 
and indeed encourage banks to apply them. 
In the United States, the resources and internal flows of a bank are traditionally subject 
to a regular audit. This then forms the basis for the levy of any possible additional 
charges relating to equity capital requirements necessary under the quantitative 
standards. This practice, which has up until now only been used in very few national 
European bank supervisory regimes, will be the focus of the 2
nd pillar of the Basel 
framework. A Supervisory Review Process (SRP) will determine the individual risk 
profile of a bank and as part of this, the bank will be subject to regular on-site audits, 
examining its key capabilities and operating processes, including its in-house 
approaches to modelling credit risk, as outlined above. 
Under the 3
rd pillar, the Basel Committee aims to increase the transparency of the 
banks’ exposure, so that financial marketers can discipline banks via their return 
requirements. 
It is important, though, that the three pillars are treated as a single framework rather 
than in isolation. Certain methods that aim to determine the necessary capital 
requirement (Pillar 1), particularly those developed in-house by banks, must only be 
applied by a bank once they have been comprehensively audited by the supervisory 
authority (Pillar 2). This can only happen once the bank has informed the financial 
markets of the structure of its systems within the framework of its disclosure obligations 
(Pillar 3).
2 
Implementation of the new framework in EU member jurisdictions is scheduled for 
year-end 2006 although some advanced approaches to risk measurement will only 
become available at year-end 2007 (Capital Adequacy Directive 3 (CAD 3)). To a large 
extent, CAD 3 follows the rules proposed by the Basel Committee. However, it is not an 
exact copy. The main differences relate to the scope of application and the range of 
approaches available to financial institutions in calculating their regulatory capital 
requirements (for further information on the key differences, see Cluse & Cremer, 
2006). By contrast with the revised framework, which is advisory, CAD 3 is legislative. 
It is the responsibility of EU member states to transpose the directive into their national 
jurisdictions, thus making it binding on all financial institutions that are domiciled in 
the EU (Dierick et al., 2005). 
 
                                                 
2 For more details about the general outline of the new framework, see Paul, 2006 and Dierick et al., 
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1.2  Grouping exposures into homogenous pools as the central feature of Basel’s 
retail IRB approach 
Under the new capital adequacy framework of Basel II, banks will for the first time be 
permitted to group their loans to private individuals
3 and small corporate clients into a 
‘retail portfolio’. As a result, they will be able to calculate the capital requirements for 
the credit risk of these retail portfolios rather than for the individual accounts (Basel 
Committee, 2006; Paul, 2006). 
While significant progress has been made in understanding the risk of commercial 
credits, we find far less research has been undertaken on measuring (and managing) 
credit risk in retail portfolios, on either a theoretical or practical basis (see Allen, 
DeLong & Saunders, 2004 and Claessens, Krahnen & Lang, 2005 for an overview of 
the current state of play in the field of retail credit research and practice). This is 
surprising given the narrow range of options that Basel II will grant to banks in 
calculating the capital requirements on their retail portfolios. There will be no 
differentiation between a foundation and an advanced internal ratings based (IRB) 
approach that is found in other asset classes (e.g. corporate portfolios). The retail IRB 
approach is an advanced approach and is therefore far more demanding.
4 First, the new 
guidelines state that banks must themselves estimate all of the loss variables, which are 
entered into the Basel formula, in order to determine the capital requirement for the 
credit risk. To do this, they must collect data on the probability of default (PD), the loss 
given default (LGD) and the exposure at default (EAD). 
Second, Basel II envisions that, when estimating these variables, banks should not value 
their retail claims individually but group them together into ‘homogenous pools’. 
According to the 2006 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revised Framework, 
section 401, banks “must assign each exposure that falls within the definition of retail 
for IRB purposes into a particular pool. Banks must demonstrate that this process 
provides for a meaningful differentiation of risk, provides for a grouping of sufficiently 
homogenous exposures and allows for accurate and consistent estimation of loss 
characteristics at pool level”. According to this, banks are required to estimate the loss 
variables PD, EAD and LGD at the pool level (section 402) in order to derive the 
capital requirement for the grouped loans. 
Basel II contains no binding instructions on how banks should group similar loans into 
pools with homogenous loss characteristics. The Basel Committee recommends only 
that they take at least three risk drivers into account (section  402): borrower risk 
characteristics, transaction risk characteristics (including product and/or collateral 
types) and delinquency of exposure. Each risk driver can be described using different 
                                                 
3   Including, e.g. credit cards, overdrafts, residential mortgages, home equity loans and other personal 
loans such as education, instalment or motor vehicle loans. 
4    Basel II allows banks to choose between the IRB approach (dealt with in this paper) and the 
standardised approach for calculating their capital requirements for credit risk. The standardised 
approach differs only marginally from the present standard with a uniform capital requirement (that is 
not related to credit quality) for loans to private customers and corporate clients. In the retail segment, 
the key modifications relate to the 25% reduction of the risk weighting across-the-board, compared 
with the status quo, and the multi-faceted risk weights for defaulted loans. 4 | KALTOFEN, PAUL & STEIN 
 
operating figures (although Basel provides no further information on these and does not 
set any standards), and for each risk driver, at least one of the operating figures should 
be included in the segmentation process. 
This means that the choice of suitable risk drivers and the respective operating figures is 
left to the banks’ discretion, giving them considerable freedom. However, banks must 
document their procedures in order for the regulatory authorities to examine them (as 
outlined in Pillar 2). 
At this point, Basel II again offers a high degree of flexibility in the design and 
implementation of this pool formation process, meaning that there are no binding 
supervisory specifications on how such a ‘pool landscape’ is meant to look. 
Furthermore, the Basel framework restricts neither the choice of criteria and threshold 
values nor the number of sub-segments. In addition to choosing suitable operating 
figures for the above-mentioned three risk drivers, the banks are also free to identify 
other relevant risk drivers and operating figures describing them and to include these in 
the pool formation process. As a qualitative minimum requirement, Basel stipulates 
only that there must be a sufficient number of loans in a pool to allow estimates to be 
made for the risk parameters that can be statistically validated and are stable over time. 
After a transitional period of three years, a data history spanning at least five years must 
be kept. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid undue concentrations of borrowers 
with regard to a particular level of credit risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2006): section 406). Basel also expects banks to conduct checks at least once a year in 
order to verify the validity of the segmentation process. 
In this paper, we take the requirement to form homogenous risk pools as the central 
feature of the retail IRB approach. In accordance with the regulatory guidelines, we 
develop an ‘optimised segmentation approach’ with regard to the credit default event, 
which will enable banks to improve their measurement of credit risk and the 
corresponding management of equity capital resources. 
When devising our method, we drew on research by Lang & Santomero (2002), Gross 
& Souleles (2002) and Hand (2001), who each refer to the advantages of statistical 
methods in optimising credit scoring models and of classification procedures in 
identifying patterns in borrower data that might be relevant to a study of default. Lang 
& Santomero (2002, p. 19) also find, that “overall required capital will be lower if PDs 
are estimated at a finer level of segmentation”. However, they provide no empirical 
demonstration of these methods. We have used the above research as a starting point 
and developed the ideas with supporting empirical evidence. 
Thus, the analysis presented here has both a methodological and a descriptive purpose. 
For the latter, risk drivers and operating figures describing them are identified in order 
to efficiently separate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ loans. Furthermore, we measure the 
implications for regulatory capital requirements. As regards methodology, we focus on 
a non-parametric ‘recursive partitioning procedure’ which, we believe, is suitable for 
grouping together the individual retail claims into homogenous pools – according to PD 
– and overcomes some disadvantages of the more familiar parametric methods. 
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2.  Approaches for identifying homogenous risk pools 
2.1  Overview of mathematical-statistical methods for the classification of retail 
loans  
From a formal point of view, the key task is to derive a sensible and selective function 
of risk indicators from a set of k predictors X1,…,Xk in order to quantify credit risk in 
terms of default. In case default is (as here) modelled as a dichotomous variable Y with 
the classes {c1, c2} this scenario represents a typical binary classification problem, 
offering a wide range of standardised, established and well documented algorithms 
(Bonne & Arminger, 2001, p. 199; Hadidi, 2003; Hauschildt, 2000; Hand & Henley, 
1997). 
For the purposes of this study, we define a loan default as the response variable, on the 
basis of which we can calculate the average probability of default (PD) expressed as the 
ratio of defaulted loans to all the loans under consideration in a pool. We describe the 
pools in which we measure PD according to different attributes of the above-mentioned 
‘operating figures’ (predictors) specific to the borrower, the transaction and the status 
of delinquency. The prognosis period is set between the observation times of the 
response variable and the predictors. Its length is specified by the objective of the 
underlying concept of research (in this case, Basel II requires a one-year period). Since, 
for the purposes of this classification, we have analysed only historical data, the 
classification techniques determine which predictors out of a given set (in this case, at a 
minimum the regulatory risk drivers) are most suitable for explaining the attributes of 
the response variable. 
Hence, a suitable approach would be to use discriminant analysis techniques, which, in 
general, and independently of the way of individual algorithms work, can be applied for 
the purpose of separating objects (in this instance, we are inferring PD from risk 
drivers) into more homogenous (sub-)segments (Bonne & Arminger, 2001, p. 199).  
The ability of each approach to distinguish between defaulted and current exposures 
roughly depends on two issues: 1) the power of the specific algorithm applied; and 2) 
the quality of data included. The latter obviously demands the storage and maintenance 
of data in a correct, complete and available manner and is not discussed here in detail. 
Following Bonne & Arminger (2001, p. 199), Figure 1 organises important methods 
according to the presence or absence of an underlying distribution assumption with 
regard to the parameter values of the predictor variables. While parametric methods 
require such assumptions (usually assuming a N(µ;σ) normal distribution), non-
parametric methods do not and so are not tied to such structures. As distribution 
assumptions are frequently not met in practice, non-parametric methods are deemed the 
more robust methods (Galindo & Tamayo, 2000, p. 115). 
Developed at the end of the 1960s, multi-variate discriminant analysis (Altman, 1968; 
Altman & Saunders, 1998), as well as logistical regression analysis, developed a 
decade later (Martin, 1977; Press & Wilson, 1978), have established themselves as the 
standard models for single loan default forecasting in banking. Both are based on a 
mathematical optimisation calculus and can be implemented with minimal data 
processing effort. Following the expansion of data storage and data processing 6 | KALTOFEN, PAUL & STEIN 
 
capacities, ‘recursive partitioning’ (also known as classification trees; Kass, 1980; 
Breiman et al., 1984) and artificial neuronal nets (Enache, 1998; Baetge, Kruse & 
Uthoff, 1996; Lohrbach, 1994; Schmidt-von Rhein & Rehkugler, 1994 and Schumann, 
Lohrbach & Bährs, 1992) have also gained in importance since the 1980s. If the less 
conventional nearest-neighbour methods, kernel density estimators, genetic algorithms 
and  fuzzy-logic-based expert systems (frequently used for further improving the 
accuracy of forecasts provided by the previously named methods) are added to the list 
then this provides the full spectrum of methods used. 
Figure 1. Selected discriminant analytical methods and algorithms 
 
 
Generally speaking, there is no optimal method since every study differs in terms of 
data structure, data availability and data quality. As a result, there have been calls for 
individualised handling, taking into account the specific strengths and weaknesses of 
the different methods (Hand & Henley, 1997, p. 535f.). In addition, the precision, 
processing speed and comprehensibility of the methods play a major role in the user’s 
selection process. All methods, under real conditions, are heuristics that do not produce 
models which perfectly predict the future default status. Every discriminant analytical 
method merely supplies an optimised model on the grounds of statistical criteria (e.g. 
minimising the number or cost of misclassification; good methodological overviews of 
methods to calculate default probability are supplied by Jafar-Shaghaghi, 1996; 
Caouette, Altman & Narayanan, 1998; Blochwitz & Eigermann, 2001; Hand, 2001 and 
the Oesterreichische Nationalbank und Finanzmarktaufsicht [Austrian National Bank 
and Financial Market Supervision], 2004). 
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2.2  Recursive partitioning as an appropriate procedure for the identification of 
homogenous risk pools 
As already mentioned, one standard method often used for classifying defaults is linear 
multi-variate discriminant analysis (LDA), which classifies a data set on the basis of the 
result Zm of the linear function 
m n, n m u, u 0 m x β x β β Z ⋅ + + ⋅ + = ...  and → {c1, c2 | Z
c},   (eq. 1) 
where βu is the u-th coefficient of a predictor Xu and xu,m is the attribute of this predictor 
for the data record m. If the function value Zm is greater than a cut-off (Z
c) fixed by the 
user, it belongs to group c1 (eg, non-defaulted), or to c2 (eg, defaulted). 
In recent years there has been a shift away from discriminant analysis in favour of 
logistical regression (LR), which has the advantages of imposing fewer formal 
statistical requirements on the predictors and producing more robust results (e.g. see 
Kaltofen, Möllenbeck & Stein, 2004; Ewert & Szczesny, 2002; Jagtiani et al., 2000; 
Maddala, 1983; Ohlson, 1980; Press & Wilson, 1978; Martin, 1977). Logistical 
regression provides, through the maximisation of a maximum likelihood function, a 
probability statement P concerning group classification ym with categories {c1, c2} of a 
data record m in the form  
m m n, n m u, u 0 Z - ) x β ... x β β ( 1 m e 1
1
e 1
1
) c P(y
+
=
+
= = ⋅ + + ⋅ +  and  ) c P(y - 1 ) c P(y 1 m 2 m = = =  (eq.  2) 
However, as parametric methods, both the discriminant analysis and logistical 
regression techniques have a disadvantage in that their application can be seriously 
impaired by outliers, extreme values and missing data for individual predictors 
(Espahbodi & Espahbodi, 2003; Schewe & Leker, 2000). Further statistical problems 
may arise from violations of the underlying normality and independence assumptions, 
the reduction of dimensionality issues, and the interpretation of the relative importance 
of individual variables rendering the accuracy of the results somewhat questionable 
(Frydman, Altman & Kao, 1985). Furthermore, the task of grouping single risk 
measures into homogenous pools has to be solved through the use of additional 
procedures. 
By contrast, classification trees (recursive partitioning) are non-parametric pattern 
recognition techniques. Although based on the methodology of discriminant analysis, 
these techniques are not subject to its restrictive conditions (Ripley, 2002; Frydman, 
Altman & Kao, 1985; Breiman et al., 1984). The advantages of classification trees lie 
in their hierarchical structure and high degree of flexibility. Moreover, extreme values 
in the predictor attributes usually have no effect on the results because separation rarely 
takes place in the marginal regions. Classification trees also allow a predictor to be used 
repeatedly at its various levels, thus taking into account the interaction between 
different predictors (Espahbodi & Espahbodi, 2003). 
The basic idea underlying this method is to subdivide in stages, by recursion, a data set 
on the basis of partitioning rules, such as xu,m < xu
C and xu,m ≥ xu
C, with xu
C as the cut-8 | KALTOFEN, PAUL & STEIN 
 
off of a predictor Xu, so that the attributes of the response variable in the new sub-
segments are more homogenous as in the former united segment (Küsters, 2001, p. 
141). Proceeding from the whole database (original pool/node of origin), the first split 
into at least two new sub-segments is set by the cut-off of the most selective predictor. 
This procedure is repeated for each sub-segment – masking out the composition and 
separation of the other segments – until one out of a set of pre-assigned stopping rules 
takes effect (Hadidi, 2003, p. 256). In this way, it is possible to ‘prune’ a classification 
tree to a manageable size. This reduces the risk of overfitting the model, and 
accordingly the error rate, when applying the process to new data sets (Küsters, 2001, p. 
141). 
Hence a pool landscape is created that resembles the branch structure of a tree (Figure 
2). At each level, other predictors (represented as geometric shapes) segment the retail 
portfolio in relation to the default event. The alpha-numerical values represent cut-offs, 
i.e., certain  attributes of the respective predictors (e.g. age of borrower ≤ 30 years 
respectively > 30 years). The loss parameters PD, LGD and EAD are measured in the 
final pools (shaded) and apply to all loans in a pool. 
Figure 2. Stylised pool landscape 
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A  possible disadvantage of recursive partitioning is that binary classification 
techniques, in which there are always two successor pools, produce their most useful 
results when applied to data with non-linear structures. Otherwise, the results would be 
a repeated separation on the basis of the same predictor. However, the technique that we 
use (CHAID, see below) is able to circumvent this problem through simultaneous 
multiway splits of a predictor. In addition, it is not possible to assign probabilities of 
occurrence to the individual exposures, as it is, for example, when using the parametric 
method of logistical regression. However, we argue that the lack of a single loan risk 
indicator does not provide a problematic constellation for the purposes of classifying 
retail exposures under Basel II: the scope of application is to calculate default rates at 
the pool level (and not at an individual exposure level) and to apply these as default 
probabilities to another set of data, in which the required parameters are delivered only 
after classification. Lastly, classification trees are criticised as being data-intensive, as 
they require a comparatively large volume of data (Espahbodi & Espahbodi, 2003, 
pp. 553 f.). Steinberg & Colla (1997) call for a minimum of 200 data records in order to USING PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION TO REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS | 9 
 
carry out a statistically sound classification. With around 413,000 records, our study 
clearly meets this requirement. 
Additionally there is empirical proof of significant statistical superiority of recursive 
partitioning that favours the recommendation to opt for classification trees versus the 
demonstrated parametric techniques to evaluate capital treatment for retail loans (see 
Kaltofen, 2006). Accordingly, in this study we investigate in more detail this new 
technique in credit risk measurement and corresponding equity capital management, 
adopting a specific recursive algorithm for a real retail loan portfolio. 
2.3  New practice: adopting the CHAID algorithm for a real retail loan portfolio 
The literature on recursive partitioning offers a wide choice of tree algorithms, which 
differ in terms of performance, conditions and fields of application (Hadidi, 2003; Loh 
& Shih, 1997; Quinlan, 1993 and 1986; Biggs, de Ville & Suen, 1991; Breiman et al., 
1984; Kass, 1980).  
With regard to the results of Kaltofen (2006), we have decided to apply the CHAID 
(Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detection) algorithm proposed by Kass (1980). 
CHAID’s main advantage is that it offers the opportunity to ‘grow’ trees with multiway 
(and not only binary) splits compared to the more common algorithms such as CART 
(Classification and Regression Tree) by Breiman et al. (1984). 
The best separation of a categorical target variable (in this case, the default event with 
binary yes/no attribute) is effected on the basis of χ²-tests. CHAID carries out two 
crucial calculation steps: the merging and splitting of categories of predictor variables 
of a data segment (Levin & Zahavi, 2001; Khoshgoftaar & Allen, 2001; Wilkinson, 
1992). 
(1) First, CHAID merges the categories of a predictor X, which differ least in regard to 
the distribution of the target variable Y. Running Pearson’s χ²-test for independence, all 
categories of X are tested pair-wise by means of 2×2 contingency tables with regard to 
the null hypothesis (H0), as to whether the distributions of Y in the two categories of X 
observed are independent of each other. The measure for the validity of H0 is the 
exceeding probability p of the test value χ²emp. The categories are merged as long as p 
exceeds the threshold “alpha-to-merge” (αmerge) set by the user , i.e., the distribution of 
Y in both segments does not differ enough to regard them as statistically unequal. 
(2) Proceeding from these results, a further χ²-test is run for all the remaining 
v categories of each (if appropriate, recoded) predictor with regard to their relation to 
the target variable in order to create pools that differ significantly from each other in 
terms of their average PD. The Bonferroni-adjusted p-value p* of the test value χ²emp* 
is computed by means of the v×2 contingency table. In the case of values of p* below a 
user-specified “alpha-to-split” (αsplit), the predictor with the lowest p*-value is used for 
segmentation, otherwise we generate a terminal node. 
The algorithm ends the search for further sub-segments as soon as the stopping criteria 
that have been set are reached (in this case, αsplit = αmerge = 0.01; minimum size of the 10 | KALTOFEN, PAUL & STEIN 
 
final pools of 1.5% of the learning population). Implementation is realised with 
AnswerTree 3.1 of SPSS. 
3.  Approaching the problem empirically 
3.1  Structure and scope of the database 
The database we have used in our research consists of around 1.1 million consumer 
loans from a specialised German bank between 1999 and 2002, which provide a 
complete picture of all the bank’s (on-balance) motor vehicle finance business (see 
Table 1, Chapter 3.3). We collected the data as of 31 December of the year in question. 
Each individual client contract corresponds to one data record. In turn, each record is 
described by a set of 60 operating figures. 
All items are instalment loans for purchasing motor vehicles and apply to the Basel 
asset class of ‘other retail’. 
3.2  Definition of non-defaulted and defaulted loans 
For the period under investigation (1999-2002), the reference bank has no consistent 
data on all the regulatory default indicators cited by Basel for the application of the 
retail IRB Approach (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006: sections 452 f.). 
These indicators (loans that are more than 90 days in arrears, provisioning for or 
restructuring of a loan, debtor insolvency, sale of claim at a loss and interest waiver by 
the bank) may state the default event either late (e.g. a debtor has become insolvent) or 
early (e.g. an assumption by the bank that a borrower will not meet the full liability and 
so creates provisions in its accounts). This results in either more or less conservative 
estimates of the probability of default, which in turn affects the level of capital 
requirement. 
The first occurrence of any of these events is sufficient for a loan to be classed as 
defaulted. 
For the purposes of the present study, we specify that a loan is in default after it has 
been in arrears for 105 days (the borrower receives a reminder with a warning that the 
loan may be called in). Although not fully in line with Basel’s 90-day rule, this is a 
good, consistent match and is as close as we could come to it on the basis of the data 
collected so far. 
We find that a parallel evaluation of the other default criteria is not practical for 
technical reasons
5. 
Furthermore, once borrowers have defaulted, they cannot be registered as ‘sound’ 
again, even if they catch up with their payments. 
                                                 
5 To fully apply for the retail IRB approach our reference bank would have to start collecting data that 
reaches the required standards: i.e. data history spanning at least five years; transitional period three 
years; parallel monitoring of all (!) events mentioned in sections 452f. USING PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION TO REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS | 11 
 
3.3  Choosing predictors to generate the pool landscape 
For the purposes of identifying homogenous risk pools in relation to the default event, 
in terms of content we have included as predictors those operating figures supplied by 
the reference bank which (a) describe the risk drivers that must be taken into account 
under the new supervisory legislation, or (b) derive from considerations about economic 
plausibility. At the formal level, the following list of requirements applies: restriction on 
ratio numbers whose numerators and denominators could have negative signs and so 
produce misleading attributes; minimum availability of attributes of a predictor in 
99.5% of all data sets; and a maximum of 98.5% of identical attributes of one predictor, 
in order to prevent an underrun of the minimum requirement of data records in each 
final pool of 1.5% of the learning population. 
On the basis of these requirements, 12 predictors remain in the data set. These are 
assigned to the following four risk drivers: (a) transaction characteristics, (b) borrower’s 
characteristics, (c) delinquency of exposure and (d) vintage. Table A 1 and Table A 2 
show the interpretation and statistical properties of the 12 predictors. We made a 
conscious decision not to carry out a time-consuming correction of outlier values of 
individual predictors (e.g. see  the maximum values in Table A 2) for ‘age of the 
borrower (years)’ and ‘length of employment (months)’. The classification algorithm 
employed does not set any cut-offs for individual extreme attributes of a cardinally 
scaled predictor. Also, due to the set minimum size of final pools (amounting to 1.5% of 
the learning population) outlier and extreme values have a negligible influence on the 
segmentation result. Because of the transparency of the pool landscape, it would be 
possible to spot an accumulation of such cases and we could then reassess the data as 
necessary. 
In order to develop a segmentation approach that is optimised according to the default 
event, we need to use only those predictors whose attributes clearly divide a set of 
loans, in terms of the default event, into sub-segments (pools) with different 
Probabilities of Default (PDs). 
We therefore collect data at four dates and from this we create three one-year 
observation periods (1/1-31/12/2000, 2001, 2002). At the end of each observation 
period we determine the respective delinquency status for each loan (defaulted yes/no), 
applying the 105-day rule. To this information we add the original attributes of the 12 
predictors at the beginning of the observation period. It is important to note that the 
following items are excluded from this evaluation: (a) those loans that have a history of 
less than one year with regard to each observation period; and (b) those which are 
already known as defaulted at the beginning of each period. In this way, over all three 
periods we obtain a total of 412,757 data records, which represent the input for the 
CHAID algorithm for calculating the pool landscape. 
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Table 1. Data input for the CHAID algorithm 
Observation period  2000  2001  2002  Total 
Data records as of 31 December  288,793 320,536 484,366  1,093,695
Minus less than 1 year under observation  178,402 202,150 283,641  664,193
Minus already known as defaulted 4,781 5,483 6,481  16,745
Total  105,610 112,903 194,244 412,757
 
3.4  Calculation of the loss parameters at pool level 
Equipped with our pool landscape, we thus compute the regulatory capital requirement 
for our reference portfolio in accordance with the Basel II risk function for ‘other 
retail’, the provisions regarding the treatment of the parameter LGD, as well as the 
requirements with respect to expected losses. We proceed as follows: 
Separately for the above-mentioned periods of 1/1-31/12/2000, 2001, 2002, we 
determine (one-year) PD, EAD and LGD values for each individual pool. For this 
purpose, the pools that have been created according to the previous steps are filled with 
the loans present in the portfolio at the end of each year. Here, the characteristics 
assigned to a loan at the beginning of that year are decisive for its allocation to one pool 
of the (later on described) pool landscape. Then, the default status of the loans is 
checked and the loss parameters can be measured at pool level.  
As mentioned previously, we calculate PD as the ratio of defaulted loans to all loans 
under consideration in a pool. We determine EAD and LGD for each defaulted 
borrower, first individually and then at pool level. The loan balance outstanding at the 
time of default represents EAD. In our study, we have chosen to define EAD as the 
gross balance outstanding at the time of default (GBO) less fees and interest already 
anticipated at their present value (fees apportionment, FA). In order to avoid values that 
are difficult to interpret in economic terms, EAD has been assigned a floor of zero. 
{}   EAD 0   FA  GBO   EAD ≤ − =  (eq.  3) 
LGD, on the other hand, quantifies the economic loss ratio in relation to EAD that 
would be lost if the borrower defaulted, including all cash inflows and outflows after 
the default event. The data supplied by the reference bank allows us to estimate LGD on 
the basis of EAD less the net cash flows on marketable motor vehicle collateral (C), 
manufacturers’ guarantees (G) and debt service paid after a regulatory default (DS).  
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
≤ ≤
− − −
= 100% LGD 10%  
EAD
  DS G C EAD
LGD  (eq.  4) 
We record these cash flows only up to the end of the year in question, due to the 
limitations of our reference data set. We impose an upside limit on LGD with a cap of 
100% and a downside limit with a floor of 10%, the latter in order to at least account for 
default-related processing costs in our calculations. We make conservative estimates of USING PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION TO REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS | 13 
 
the cash flows from the realisation of collateral securities (C), which are derived from 
depreciation models on the basis of listings from specialised price information brokers. 
Using these individual annual values, the next step is to calculate – again at pool level – 
the multi-annual default-weighted averages for PD, LGD
e (average expected loss ratio) 
and EAD as prescribed by Basel II (in our study, the averages each consist of three 
values). 
With regard to the occurrence of systemic risks and their impact on LGD estimates, 
Basel II requires the calculation not only of the average expected loss ratio LGD
e, but 
also a downturn ‘conditional’ loss ratio (LGD
c) to be calculated. However, the revised 
framework does not yet contain any binding instructions on how banks should evaluate 
LGD
c. In order to meet this obligation, we set LGD
c as the highest loss ratio (at pool 
level) observed in our data history raised by another 10% (factor 1.1). 
These parameters can now be included in the calculation of the regulatory capital 
requirement for a forthcoming period: we fill our pools exclusively with only non-
defaulted loans present in the reference portfolio at T = 1/1/2003 (according to their 
effective characteristics in relation to the predictors assigned to each pool). We assign 
to these loans the respective pool estimates for PD, EAD, and LGD, which are based on 
historical loans with the same characteristics (e.g.  the PD to be estimated for T = 
1/1/2003 of a given pool i is obtained from the default-weighted sum of the PDs for this 
pool i measured in t = 2000, 2001 and 2002). 
Based on the Revised Framework’s UL-only approach, the calculation of the regulatory 
capital requirement for the unexpected loss (UL) for all pools has the general form: 
If a loan is known to be in default at the time the regulatory capital requirement is 
calculated, Basel II requires that these loans are split into a separate pool. This pool 
needs to be considered in addition to the pool landscape described in Chapter 4.1. By 
definition, the PD of these loans is 100%. The regulatory capital cushioning for their 
unexpected loss then works out at: 
[] () ()
[] () ()
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∑
=
  (eq. 5)
i: index for pools with I =1, 2,…,I 
p: non-defaulted (performing) loans 
UL: unexpected loss 
ρi: asset correlation of loans in pool i 
PDi: probability of default of loans in pool i 
LGDi
c: downturn loss ratio of loans in pool i 
EADi: exposure at default of loans in pool i 
Φi: number of performing loans in pool i 
SF: Scaling-factor 1.06 
GBO: gross balance of all outstanding loans 
FA: apportionment of fees 
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  (eq. 6)
K: capital treatment [in currency] 
d: defaulted loans 
 
j: index for defaulted loans with j =1, 2,…,J 
LGDj
e: loss ratio of defaulted loan j 
 
Where loan claims have already defaulted, the LGD parameter is determined 
individually for each claim j, with a distinction made between average LGD and 
downturn LGD. The EAD also relates to the individual defaulted claim j. 
With regard to the expected loss, Basel assumes that it has been covered by earned 
standard risk costs. This has to be approved in a calculation based on the specific and 
general provisions that have been created. If the specific and general provisions created 
are less than the expected loss, the bank is required to deduct this shortfall from Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital, with the amount split evenly between the two tiers. The bank may 
count any excess provisions, up to a maximum amount set by the regulators, as 
supplementary Tier 2 capital. 
For the reference bank, we found specific and general provisions exceeding the 
expected loss of the retail portfolio under consideration here. The results are available 
from the authors on request, but for the purposes of the present study they do not need 
to be discussed further here as we focus primarily on the UL portion of regulatory 
capital charge. 
4.  Results of the empirical study 
4.1  The pool landscape 
The CHAID algorithm divides the reference portfolio (on the basis of the attributes of 
our predictors as discussed in Chapter 3.3) into 46 pools, of which 31 are final pools. 
Figure 3 shows the arrangement of the three segmentation levels in the classification 
tree we obtained, from which we derived the designations used in the results tables for 
all 46 pools. USING PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION TO REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS | 15 
 
Figure 3. Calculated classification 
 
 
By far the most effective predictor with regard to credit default is the Change of 
Delinquency Status (CDS) numerator (evident from the highest test value χ²emp* in 
Table 2), followed by ‘length of employment’ and ‘age of credit’ twice each. Moreover, 
CHAID has also shown to be effective in terms of ‘positive bureau (SCHUFA) 
attributes’, ‘item financed’ and ‘down payment’. The latter is selected in 7 of 11 splits 
on the third level. Table 2 lists the criteria for all separations plus the measured test 
value χ²emp*, the p*-value derived from it, the numbers and IDs of all successor pools 
and the corresponding cut-offs for all the splits carried out. 
Table 2. Characteristics of the splits 
Prede-
cessor  Successor 
Pool #  Predictor  Pool #  χ²emp*  p* Cut-offs 
0  Change of Delinquency Status  1 - 4  33,671.92  < 10
-4  0; 1; 5 
1  Length of employment  5 - 10  1016.26  < 10
-4  0; 25; 40; 78; 215; >215. „missing“ 
2  Length of employment  11 - 12  126.88  < 10
-4  25; >25. „missing“ 
3  Age of credit  13 - 14  1,336.16  < 10
-4 280 
4  Age of credit  15 - 17  337.31  < 10
-4 559;  1,028 
5  Down payment  18 - 21  109.95  < 10
-4  0; 2,556.45: 6,340.02 
6  Down payment  22 - 23  155.29  < 10
-4 1,022.58 
7  Down payment  24 - 25  97.65  < 10
-4 1,732.77 
8  Down payment  26 - 30  187.25  < 10
-4  0; 1,022.58; 2,556.45; 4,550.50 
9  Down payment  31 - 34  213.22  < 10
-4  511.29; 1,732.77; 3,067.75 
10  Item financed  35 - 36  38.41  < 10
-4  Used car; new car 
12  Down payment  37 - 38  54.12  < 10
-4 1,732.77 
13  Down payment  39 - 40  54.22  < 10
-4 511.29 
14  Length of employment  41 - 42  78.12  < 10
-4  40; >40. „missing“ 
15  Positive SCHUFA  43 - 44  57.63  < 10
-4 1 
16  Positive SCHUFA  45 - 46  33.71  < 10
-4 1 
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The test values χ²emp* for all splits in the pool landscape we created are statistically 
highly significant. The probability of error is at most 4.79·10
-8, confirming the 
robustness of our results. It is evident that CHAID has managed to ‘exploit’ two of the 
advantages it has over other classification algorithms. Firstly, it has divided predecessor 
pools into more than just two successors. Secondly, it has revealed the specific 
interactions between predictors over the various levels of the segmentation. 
In order to create a basis on which we can carry out an economic interpretation of the 
statistical results, we put all 412,757 data sets of our learning sample into the 31 final 
pools according to their attributes. We then measure the resulting average (historical, 
default weighted) PD and LGD values for each pool. (In the next chapter, we calculate 
the regulatory capital requirement. We must then value those loans that effectively fall 
into the pools at the time of the respective due date, with the historical loss parameters 
calculated in line with the provisions of Basel II (see Chapter 4.3). 
Proceeding from the PD of the node of origin equal to 3.64%, the segmentation 
produced homogenous final pools with either much smaller or larger PDs (Table A 3): 
the measured PDs amount to between 0.23% and 24.96%. In the case of LGDs, we 
calculated values of between 19.96% and 37.63%.  
Pool no. 21 – the pool with a very low PD of 0.69% and simultaneously the lowest 
LGD (19.96%) – contains, for example, exposures that have never been delinquent 
(predecessor pool no. 0). It also shows (small) company clients (who qualify for the 
retail segment), which indicate an employment duration of nil (predecessor pool no. 1) 
and fall into the segment with the highest down payments (predecessor pool no. 5). In 
contrast, pool no. 39 exhibits a particularly high PD/LGD combination (19.61% / 
35.39%): it contains loans from debtors with a frequent change of the delinquency 
status (two to five; predecessor pool no. 0), who only recently received their loan (max. 
280 days; predecessor pool no. 3) and have made only small down payments (max. 
€511.29 = 1,000 Deutschmark; predecessor pool no. 13). 
The pool landscape does not show an undue concentration in any particular pool. Every 
end pool contains a minimum of 1.5% and a maximum of 8.1% of all data records. 
Our results confirm the minimum risk drivers that should, according to Basel, be taken 
into account: borrower risk characteristics, transaction risk characteristics and 
delinquency of exposure. However, the ‘delinquency of exposure’ risk driver, stipulated 
for regulatory purposes, needs to be interpreted with caution. Operating figures that 
describe it tend to (retrospectively) document the non-performance of a loan more than 
predict its default. 
With regard to our CDS numerator, it is worth noting that an additional validation, 
which separately records upgrades and downgrades, would not improve our results (in 
any case, the occurrence of downgrades, signalling an improved credit quality, is rare). 
What matters is the stability of the credit relationship over time, which, in this study, we 
describe via a higher or lower CDS numerator.  
The importance of the ‘age of credit’ variable for our segmentation is notable because 
in its second consultation paper (Basel Committee, 2001 [CP 2]), Basel still envisaged a 
requirement whereby banks should carry out a segmentation on the basis of the vintage USING PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION TO REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS | 17 
 
of the exposures (CP 2, section 447). However, this requirement does not appear in 
either CP  3 (Basel Committee, 2003) or the revised framework. Nevertheless, our 
results (which in this respect match credit agency findings concerning indicators for 
private debt and debt overload) provide clear evidence that the age of a loan is indeed 
an important risk driver in the retail portfolio (SCHUFA, 2003). CHAID identifies ‘age 
of credit’ as a selective predictor exclusively for low-quality loans that have been 
delinquent at least once (CDS > 1). Regarding these pools (no. 3 and 4 as well as their 
successors), we observe particularly high probabilities of default in approximately the 
first nine to 19 months of the credit’s life cycle. An explanation for this comparatively 
early occurrence of payment difficulties could be that, initially, borrowers are often still 
financing their principal repayments out of savings, without having adequately adjusted 
their monthly income to their new borrowing commitments. Irrespective of the 
regulatory legislation, in their own interests banks should therefore collect enough data 
on this risk factor to enable an assessment of whether the attributes of the loan life cycle 
are significant enough to justify segmentation. 
Moreover, our result would seem to contradict the phrase “the longer, the riskier”, 
which Basel applies in other risk categories (e.g. corporates) when assigning risk 
weights. For instance, in pool no. 13, CHAID assigns a PD of 17.13% to exposures 
below a vintage of 19 months-on-book, while in pool no. 14 the PD of older loans drops 
to 5.11%. The volume of exclusive (‘private’) information available to the bank is likely 
to increase over the life cycle of a lending relationship, thus enabling the bank to obtain 
a more accurate picture of the borrower and to exercise greater influence on reducing 
the risk of default. 
 
4.2  Segmentation quality of the pool landscape 
In order to measure the discriminatory power of a rating system and the performance of 
the PD quantification, the Basel Committee´s Validation Group (a subgroup of the 
Research Task Force reviewing and developing research on validation issues) proposes 
graphic as well as analytical methods, including: 
•  Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) 
•  Area-Under-Curve (AUC) 
•  Cumulative Accuracy Profile (CAP)  
•  Accuracy Ratio (AR, also: Somers’ D, Gini-Coefficient, Powerstat) 
We report in Table 3 on the AUC. It offers the advantage of having its meaning 
substantiated by a significance measure (p-value) which is derived using the Mann-
Whitney-U-Test (equivalent to the Wilcoxon rank sum test). In the case of a perfect 
segmentation, the AUC equals 1 (100%), for the random model 0.5 (50%), while for 
realistic models the AUC adopts values ranging between these two figures. 
Consequently, higher forms of the AUC correspond to an enhanced predictive power (= 
enhanced segmentation quality; for a comprehensive overview see Basel Committee, 
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Finanzmarktaufsicht, 2004, pp. 99-146; Blochwitz et al., 2004; Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2003, pp. 61-74). 
Starting with the root node, Table 3 shows that the segmentation quality, i.e., predictive 
power, of our CHAID classification tree increases with each additional segmentation 
level. On level 3, we record an AUC rating of 0.84 (84%) and thus reach a value range 
which characterises good models. The U-Tests secure the indicated AUC values with 
highly significant p values (p < 0.001). Furthermore, this result has proven statistically 
stable on a ten-fold cross-validation (see Kaltofen, 2006 for more detailed results on 
model stability). 
 
4.3  The relationship between segmentation quality and regulatory capital 
Having obtained our pool landscape and valued its predictive power, we can now 
illustrate the results regarding the effect of segmentation quality on the regulatory 
capital requirement for the unexpected loss portion of the credit risk. 
In order to highlight the influence of segmentation quality on the required amount of 
regulatory capital, we value the loans present in the portfolio at T = 1/1/2003 according 
to the specifications of Basel II. We apply historical multi-year weighted PD averages 
observed for the period 1/1/2000-31/12/2002 at pool level as estimates for the coming 
period and apply them to eq. 5. As stipulated by the new supervisory legislation, we 
also introduce a downturn LGD-scenario: we explicitly consider the uncertainty of the 
recoverability of the loans if default were to occur. This implies that a UL-risk weight 
needs to be assigned not only to the unexpected portion of LGD of non-defaulted loans 
in the retail portfolio (eq. 5) but also to those already defaulted (eq. 6). From the bank 
regulator’s perspective, calculating the capital requirement without taking account of 
different macroeconomic scenarios could result in a tendency to underestimate the 
required risk cushioning (in terms of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital). Unlike what is assumed 
in Basel’s stochastic model (eq. 5), the regulators do not see PD and LGD 
independently of each other. In the event of an economic downturn, there is a risk of an 
increase in the probabilities of default (which alone would imply an increase in the 
regulatory capital requirement). Furthermore, as a consequence of market distortions, 
the effective loss ratios could also fall short of those expected when collateral (here, 
motor vehicles) is realised (see Sorge, 2004 with further references). 
As a consequence, the Basel Committee called for the banks’ internal LGD estimates to 
be based on conservative economic scenarios. We satisfy this requirement (which has 
not yet been further specified) by taking as the stress value the worst LGD value in the 
available data history raised by 10%, measured at pool level (see above Chapter 3.4). 
This stress value exceeds expected multi-year default-weighted averages LGD
e. In the 
reference bank’s portfolio, this difference between stress LGD and expected LGD leads 
to a UL-capital requirement for a latent systemic risk for the defaulted loans of κ
d
UL = 
0.09%. 
Table 3 shows the results for all three selective segmentation levels of our CHAID 
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Table 3. UL regulatory capital requirement 
  Level of segmentation 
  Level 0  Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 
Area-Under-Curve  50.0% 79.3% 82.8% 84.0% 
p-value     < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Minimum regulatory capital for unexpected losses: 
Performing (κ
p)  3.56% 3.29% 3.03% 2.92% 
Defaulted (κ
d)  0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 
Total  3.66% 3.38% 3.13% 3.02% 
 
As segmentation quality increases through the levels, the UL capital requirement for 
performing loans in T = 1/1/2003 falls by 18.0% in comparison with the level 0. On 
level 3, the requirement is 2.92% for the UL-portion of the credit risk of current loans, 
and 3.56% for the node of origin. At the most selective steps, 1 and 2, a marked 
reduction in the required capital is registered when jumping from the predecessor pools 
to these discriminatory levels: 7.8% at the transition from level 0 to 1 and another 7.7% 
from level 1 to 2.
6 At level 3, 11 separations with declining power take place. Although 
they lead to a further improvement in segmentation quality, they cause a smaller 
reduction of 3.6% in capital cushioning.  
This effect operates in principle between segmentation quality and the amount of the 
regulatory capital requirement and thus provides empirical backing for the thesis 
proposed at the start of this study, that “overall required capital will be lower if PDs are 
estimated at a finer level of segmentation”.  
Finally, to interpret the comparatively low level of overall UL-capital requirement 
calculated, we need to focus on the combination of low LGD values and low PD values 
within our reference portfolio. To produce our results, we used a portfolio comprising 
only motor vehicle loans. In the event of a loan default, there is the potential for a bank 
to recover up to approximately 75% of the exposure by selling the vehicles accepted as 
collateral in comparatively efficient secondary markets. At the same time, consistent 
with the findings of risk management literature and credit agency data, borrowers show 
particular sensitivity when motor vehicles are used as collateral. The anxiety of 
borrowers (many of whom depend on a car for their jobs) to avoid repossession of their 
car by the bank means that they are more willing to keep up payments on the loan 
versus payments on other instalment loans for goods/services that are regarded by the 
borrower as less important. 
 
                                                 
6 The calculation of these figures is based on exact values. Differences may occur when deriving them 
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5.  Conclusion and policy recommendations 
In this paper, we have introduced an innovative technique, which adheres to the 
provisions of Basel II, for grouping retail loans into homogenous pools. To do this, we 
used non-parametric recursive partitioning supported by the CHAID algorithm. This 
non-parametric method overcomes many of the shortcomings of parametric techniques, 
such as discriminant analysis or logistical regression, which have been employed by a 
number of banks. The empirical results confirm that the ability to separate sound from 
potentially defaulting borrowers with greater precision through the formation of 
homogenous pools reduces regulatory capital requirements. 
Our process of classifying loans according to selective default predictors lowers the 
required capital for UL by almost 18% over the different segmentation levels for the 
period under review. Hence, our analyses imply that significant cost savings can be 
made in terms of equity capital (or, alternatively, that opportunities can be provided to 
increase lending capacity). 
As a result of our study, we recommend that our findings be used by the managements 
of banks to initiate a critical review of existing rating and scoring processes. If 
participants are to benefit fully from the demonstrated effects of reducing capital 
cushioning, it is essential that they choose not only an efficient and selective algorithm, 
but that they also ensure that data quality is high and meets the demands of Basel II. 
Essentially, the algorithm can only be as good as the data it uses. 
However, to demonstrate the risk homogeneity of exposures within each segment, Basel 
II requires that banks treat the loans in each segment in the same manner in their 
internal risk management processes (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004): 
section 232). This may involve underwriting and structuring of the loans, economic 
capital allocation, pricing and other terms of the lending agreement, monitoring, and 
internal reporting. As a result, there is a trade-off between the potential cost savings on 
equity capital from an increasingly differentiated pool landscape and the additional 
costs of managing such a pool landscape (namely in terms of personnel costs). 
With the help of the method introduced here, a meaningful differentiation of the credit 
risk becomes possible. The default probability and the amount of possible credit losses 
can be consistently assessed with precision. For bank profitability, it is of the utmost 
importance that banks include their risk assessment for different groups of borrowers in 
their credit pricing and indeed earn the calculated risk premiums in the market. In this 
respect, a recent survey carried out by the institute for banking and finance (ikf) shows 
that, for the German consumer credit market, the vast majority of banks still price their 
loans across-the-board. Scoring information is predominantly limited to calculate a cut-
off-score, below which no credit is issued (Paul & Stein, 2006).  
If all borrowers have to pay the same price for a loan regardless of the risk that they 
present in terms of defaulting, consumers with a good credit score ultimately subsidise 
those with poor creditworthiness. Ideally, though, the reverse should be true. Those 
borrowers that are able to keep their finances in good order should be rewarded for 
doing so. For those consumers with poor credit scores, high interest rates should serve 
as a warning that increasing their credit burden may not be advisable. In this respect, USING PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION TO REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS | 21 
 
risk-based pricing signals promote the goal of consumer protection by supporting 
responsible borrowing decisions, which in view of the growing debt burden of private 
households, has become increasingly important. Furthermore, empirical studies indicate 
that access to credit for higher-risk households is improved when banks use advanced 
methods to better evaluate the credit quality of borrowers and differentiate loan prices 
according to the risk that has been measured (Edelberg, 2003; Berger, Frame & Miller, 
2002; Mester, 1997).  
With regard to the new Supervisory Review Process (see Chapter 1 above), supervisors 
will assess and approve the risk measurement and management systems for each bank 
individually. Decisive in this respect will be the maintenance of fair and equal treatment 
of different modi operandi used in the banks reviewed. Therefore, in the course of the 
audit process, indications will have to be found as to how far certain structural features 
of an individual bank’s risk management require certain ‘stays’ (possibly with the 
development of minimum or maximum requirements). The Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has committed itself in this respect to a flexible approach 
which gives banks considerable room for manoeuvre. Different opinions on the specific 
ways in which methods are applied in practice are expressly encouraged for the 
promotion of innovation within this sector. However, the path chosen by a bank must be 
documented and its consistency with the guidelines issued by the supervisory 
authorities must be set out in detail. There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. 
Finally, this highlights an inherent conflict in the new concept of qualitative 
supervision. If the provisions of the revised framework remain in a general rather than a 
specific form, they will be left open to interpretation by the supervised institutions and 
supervising institutions will have considerable margin for manoeuvre in how they 
evaluate those institutions. On the one hand, this entails a risk that actions will be 
hidden from view by banks; while on the other there is a danger that the banks will 
receive unequal treatment. As such, the objective of competitive equality could be 
jeopardised if, for example, different audit teams apply conflicting standards to internal 
rating systems. The alternative, i.e., fixing rigid compliance to highly detailed 
regulations (almost in the sense of quantitative norms) would mean that supervisory 
guidelines essentially pre-define risk management criteria. If this were to occur, there is 
a danger that one of the original aims of Basel II, i.e. the promotion of further 
development and improvement of risk management through competition among 
financial institutions, would be lost. It will be very important to ensure that the 
regulatory audit teams are fully equipped with the methodological (and perhaps more 
importantly, social) skills that will enable them to act as a competent but pragmatic/ 
‘proportionate’ regulator, while recognising the scale and complexity of the activities of 
the credit institution under review. 
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ANNEX 
Table A 1. Overview of the predictors 
Predictor Interpretation 
Age of borrower  Our assumption is that the income status of younger borrowers is less 
secure than that of older borrowers. In the case of small corporate clients 
that qualify for the retail category, the variable relates to the age of the 
company (SCHUFA 2004; with regard to small enterprises see Berger & 
Udell, 1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). 
Age of credit  Data from credit agencies on debt and debt overload in the private 
household sector show a positively skewed frequency distribution for 
loans with payment difficulties depending on the age of the loan 
(SCHUFA, 2003). Thus, we assume that payment problems are more 
likely in early phases of the loan life cycle than in later phases. In the 
current study, we measure the age of the loan (‘vintage’) in days. 
Credit score  At the start of the loan period, every private individual is subjected to an 
application scoring procedure. The higher the score, the higher the 
estimated credit quality. In this procedure both borrower and product 
characteristics are taken into account. (In the case of small enterprises that 
qualify for the retail category, the attribute of this variable is zero.) 
Current balance  The amount of the outstanding loan balance is available for each capital 
calculation date. The balance of the loan is presumed to have an influence 
on the default risk depending on the combination and composition of 
other predictors mentioned here (eg, the item being financed). 
Down payment  The amount of the down payment indicates the borrower’s capacity to 
build up financial reserves and to finance investment not only by 
borrowing. 
Guarantor  This binary number states whether or not there is a guarantor for the 
borrower’s liabilities. If there is, this should reduce the default rate. 
Item financed  Risk management literature suggests causality between the value of an 
item being financed and the default event: declining values accompany 
increasing probabilities of default (see Altman et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
credit agency data on the insolvency of private households show that the 
willingness to keep up the payments on a loan varies according to the item 
(or services) being financed – it falls as the importance of the 
goods/services to the borrower falls (SCHUFA, 2004). In this study, we 
can only make a distinction between new and demonstration vehicles, and 
used vehicles. 
Length of 
employment 
In the case of private individuals, a long period of employment (here 
measured in months) implies greater financial stability. 
Manufacturer’s  
subsidy 
Where the dealer offers financing facilities at a preferential rate of 
interest, the difference from the usual market rate is borne by the 
manufacturer. This manufacturer’s subsidy is also paid if a borrower 
defaults. It is therefore a form of loan collateral on the part of the dealer. 
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Numerator for  
change of  
delinquency 
status (CDS) 
Any change of delinquency status (to either a more or less favourable 
status) increases this numerator. It indicates the stability of the borrower’s 
financial circumstances. A numerator of zero means that no arrears have 
occurred with this borrower so far; values greater than zero signal that a 
delinquent payment resulted in a reminder on at least one occasion.  
Unanswered  
enquiries at 
SCHUFA 
When checking creditworthiness as an integral part of the credit 
application process, the bank obtains information on the payment 
behaviour of (potential) borrowers from the German credit bureau 
SCHUFA (Protective Association for Customer Finance and the 
Safeguarding of Credit). On every enquiry, SCHUFA keeps the borrower 
file open until the bank tells it that a transaction has been concluded. If a 
loan request has been rejected or the customer withdraws without telling 
the bank, the file remains open (unanswered). So the more often enquiries 
remain ‘unanswered’, the more often (it is assumed) previous loan 
applications have been rejected on the grounds of low credit quality. 
Positive report 
from SCHUFA 
The more positive attributes SCHUFA has stored about a customer (e.g. 
former loans that were amortised) the better we expect his/her actual 
creditworthiness to be. 
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Table A 2. Statistical properties of the predictors 
Predictors (dimension)  Scale Arithm.
mean 
Median 
(mode) 
Standard 
deviation  Min  Max 
(A) Item financed (n/a)  N - (used  car) -  - - 
(A) Manufacturer’s subsidy (Euro)  C 181.47 0.00 384.47  0.00  8,170.44 
(A/D) Current balance (Euro)  C 7,717.61 6,082.33 6,109.98  0.51  170,444.26 
(A/B) Credit score (points)  O 430.18 598.00 302.85  0.00 937.00 
(B) Age of borrower (years)  C 37.49 40.00 17.88  0.00  904.00 
(B) Down payment (Euro)  C 2,585.13 1,733.28 3,025.22  0.00  117,523.51 
(B) Length of Employment (months)  C 86.03 57.00 95.60  0.00  2,207.00 
(B) Guarantor (n/a)  N - (no) -  - - 
(B) unanswered SCHUFA requests (amt.)  C 0.33 0.00 0.60  0.00 9.00 
(B) positive SCHUFA data (amt.)  C 2.27 2.00 2.33  0.00 9.00 
(C) CDS (amount)  C 2.03 0.00 6.18  0.00  100.00 
(D) Age of credit (days)  C 447.82 280.00 437.82  0.00  4,395.00 
Scales: C: cardinal; N: nominal; O: ordinal 
Risk drivers (A): transaction characteristics, (B): borrower characteristics, (C): delinquency of exposure, 
(D): vintage 
 
Table A 3. Characteristics of all 31 final pools (averages based on the whole data set of 
the learning sample) 
  No. of data records        No. of data records     
Pool #  Absolut
e 
Relativ
e  PD  LGD  Pool #  Absolute  Relative PD  LGD 
11 6,700  1.6%  5.52%  26.96%  32  16,631 4.0%  0.69%  28.01% 
17 11,655  2.8%  14.06%  30.82%  33 20,299  4.9%  0.40%  22.67% 
18 15,427  3.7%  2.13%  32.04%  34 33,408  8.1%  0.23%  23.83% 
19 19,557  4.7%  1.47%  22.09%  35 12,773  3.1%  0.69%  27.64% 
20 24,433  5.9%  1.14%  22.15%  36 22,393  5.4%  0.25%  29.47% 
21 10,376  2.5%  0.69%  19.96%  37 8,721  2.1%  3.31%  26.94% 
22 12,408  3.0%  3.80%  35.30%  38 6,409  1.6%  1.42%  23.82% 
23 13,273  3.2%  1.36%  24.48%  39 6,350  1.5%  19.61%  35.39% 
24 15,848  3.8%  2.16%  32.94%  40 6,555  1.6%  14.72%  23.10% 
25 13,885  3.4%  0.76%  20.64%  41 8,330  2.0%  6.78%  27.33% 
26 12,596  3.1%  1.83%  37.63%  42 13,120  3.2%  4.05%  26.68% 
27 8,805  2.1%  1.35%  28.17%  43 6,570  1.6%  24.96%  26.88% 
28 10,903  2.6%  0.89%  25.31%  44 9,061  2.2%  19.87%  28.92% 
29 12,190  3.0%  0.58%  26.11%  45 7,441  1.8%  17.81%  25.86% 
30 11,581  2.8%  0.27%  20.51%  46 8,557  2.1%  14.43%  28.84% 
31 26,502    6.4%  1.11%  35.84%           
  
European Credit Research Institute 
The European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) is an independent 
research institute devoted to the study of credit markets and the policies 
affecting these markets. Its principal interests are the macroeconomic and 
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